Kahneman and Tversky and their behavioral economics stand in a long tradition of applying mathematics to human behavior. In the seventeenth century, attempts to describe rational behavior in mathematical terms run into problems with the formulation of the St. Petersburg 
Introduction

This quote in The Economist
The mathematics of rational behavior
The behavioral economics of Kahneman and Tversky begins in 1654. In that year, noblemangambler Chevalier de Méré presents Blaise Pascal, and therewith Piere Fermat, with a number of gambling problems 2 . Upon de Méré's instigation, Pascal and Fermat discuss amongst others the following problem. Suppose two noblemen sit down to play a coin-tossing gamble in which the first to have two heads or tails wins, a game that ends after at most three tosses.
Suppose further that for some reason the two noblemen-gamblers have to stop after one heads. What would in that case be a rational division of the money? Intuitively it is clear that the money should not be split equally because the player with heads has a larger chance of winning. But how much more should this player receive? When continued, the game could end in three ways: 1) heads (heads player wins), 2) tails, tails (tails player wins), 3) tails, heads (heads player wins). It thus seems that the money should be divided (2/3:1/3). The crucial conceptual insight, however, is to see that in fact there are four possibilities. We also have to consider the imaginary toss after the second toss turns heads. The complete number of possibilities is: 1) heads, heads (heads player wins), 2) heads, tails (heads player wins), 3) tails, tails (tails player wins), 4) tails, heads (heads player wins). A rational division of the money is thus (3/4:1/4). Contrary to for instance Samuelson (1977) 's view, determining the rational solution may involve quite a conceptual step
From the large body of literature on the Enlightenment mathematicians of probability it is well known that no distinction was made between determining the rational solution in situations of uncertainty, and the question of what a rational person would actually do in such situations 3 . These two were one and the same thing. Hence, it was a major problem for the mathematics when it became clear that gambles could be constructed in which the rational solution provided by the mathematics was clearly at odds with the intuitive idea of the rational solution. The most famous example of these problems is the St. Petersburg paradox.
Consider again the two noblemen who want to play a coin-tossing gamble. But suppose now that nobleman one proposes to nobleman two to pay him two ducats when the coin falls heads on the first toss, four ducats if it also falls heads on the second toss, eight ducats for the third heads, and so on ad infinitum until the coin turns up tails. Nobleman one, however, does not play this game for free and demands an entrance fee. When nobleman two wants to be rational, what is the entrance fee he is maximally willing to pay? The pay-off from this gamble is
, with i the number of heads tossed; the probability is for nobleman two is
Hence, a rational nobleman two would be willing to pay all his wealth and all the wealth he will earn in the rest of his life as an entrance fee for this gamble. Intuitively everybody readily agrees that this is ridiculous. It simply cannot be rational to put the accumulated wealth of one's entire life in such a gamble. Something has to be wrong with the mathematics. But what?
A solution to the St. Petersburg was offered by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. Bernoulli's idea was simple: do not use the objective value of the gamble, but use the subjective value, the utility.
" [T] he value of an item must not be based on its price, but rather on the utility it yields. The price of the item is dependent only on the thing itself and is equal for everyone; the utility however, is dependent on the particular circumstances of the person making the estimate. Thus there is no doubt that a gain of one thousand ducats is more significant to a pauper than to a rich man though both gain the same amount." 4 Bernoulli defines utility to be a marginally increasing function of wealth, where wealth is loosely defined as the monetary value of all the individual's possessions plus the individual's capacities to earn money. The utility derived from a given monetary gain thus decreases with increasing initial wealth. In mathematical terms,
with c a constant, dU the change in utility, W wealth, and dW the change in wealth.
Graphically, Figure 1 . The figure is an adapted version from Bernoulli (1738 Bernoulli ( /1954 When instead of the objective value of the monetary gain the subjective value of the utility is taken the mathematical expectation 6 of the St. Petersburg paradox will not go to infinity but, depending on the exact parameters of equation 2, will asymptotically go to a number that is quite reasonable 7 . Bernoulli thus successfully introduced a theory of maximizing expected utility (EUT) as the basis for the study of rational decision behavior under uncertainty.
Anachronistically, this may be seen as the beginning of decision theory.
Psychophysics
Bernoulli's relation between wealth and utility was corroborated by the work of the psychophysicists. In the middle of the 1850s Gustav Fechner, dissatisfied with the dominant Cartesian mind-body distinction, was looking for a more scientific basis for psychology 8 . His solution was to base psychology upon the idea that human beings should be seen as on the one hand receiving input from the world through their senses, and on the other hand producing output in the form of behavior. Fechner, in other words, invented the stimulusresponse paradigm. Now, it is clear that not every objective stimulus will evoke the same subjective sensation. An extra kilogram feels differently when one is already carrying five, or already carrying fifty kilograms. The first step in this new research paradigm therefore was to measure how external stimuli are perceived by human beings. The psychophysical law that describes the relation between objective stimulus and subjective sensation that has become known as the Weber-Fechner law is the following.
where dSe is the change in sensation, St the stimulus, dSt the change in stimulus and c a constant. Graphically, Figure 2 , the psychophysical stimulus-sensation relation
Both the formula and the graph are similar to Bernoulli's relation between wealth and utility.
Indeed, when we think of Bernoulli's wealth as the objective stimulus and utility as the subjective sensation it is not difficult to see how Bernoulli's paper anachronistically can be interpreted as the psychophysics of wealth and utility. Blaug (1996 ), p.316-318. Like Blaug (1996 I am making some very rigorous historcial shortcuts here. For extensive discussions on the relation between English marginalists, Benthamite utilitarianism, psychophysics and psychophysiology see Maas (2005) , Sigot (2002) , Warke (2000) 10 Cohen (1997) Benthamite utility to a one-dimensional measurement scale of utility for hedonic pleasure seeking and pain avoiding individuals. Therewith psychophysics connected the mathematics of human behavior with the utility of utilitarianism.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern
One of the most important books in the social sciences of the twentieth century is without any doubt von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) .
Game theory is an extension of decision theory to situations in which the rational decision depends on behavior of other agents. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) shows that also in games in which the uncertainty is endogenous it is possible to say something about what is rational behavior 11 . Such games include Bridge, Chess, strategic price setting behavior of firms, and nuclear arms races during cold wars.
In the book, von Neumann and Morgenstern first assume for reasons of simplification utility to be equivalent with money.
"We wish to concentrate on one problem -which is not that of the measurement of utilities and of preferences-and we shall therefore attempt to simplify all other characteristics as far as reasonably possible. We shall therefore assume that the aim of all participants in the economic system, consumers as well as entrepreneurs, is money, or equivalently a single monetary commodity. This is supposed to be unrealistically divisible and substitutable, freely transferable and identical, even in the quantitative sense, with whatever "satisfaction" or "utility" is desired by each participant."
(emphasis added)
With regard to the unit of analysis von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) thus effectively turn the clock back to before Bernoulli, when the rational decision depended on the absolute, objective value of money. For von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) the agents in decision problems, games and the economy generally want to maximize their monetary income, not their Bernoullian utility. However, in a move that stands in a long history of concept-juggling von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) label this money 'utility'. Von Neumann and 11 See for an illuminating example of the transition from decision theory to game theory the translation of Borel's papers for Econometrica in Frechet (1953) . 12 Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), p.8 Morgenstern's agents maximize money, or monetary equivalents, but this money is called utility 13 .
Secondly, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) construct a set of formal constraints on the relation between the preferences of the agents in their games. This set of constraints is best seen as a specification of assumptions that had been left unspecified or implicit in the earlier work on the mathematics of rational decision behavior. Along von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) there exist many other, related axiomatic sets. The formal set of constraints of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and others can furthermore be integrated with the axiomatic constraints for decision behavior under certainty as presented by for instance Samuelson (1947) . That said, the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) are not yet as worked out and as neatly written down as they have been by later authors.
However, all contain in one form or another, implicitly or explicitly, each of the following 
Friedman and Savage
Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage write two articles together that are an indicative precursor to much of subsequent developments in the theories of rational decision behavior in economics and psychology. 15 Economist Friedman and mathematician Savage adhere to two different views on how to approach rational economic behavior under uncertainty. Friedman adheres to the received methodological distinction in economics between positive and 13 Alternatively, one could say that the value used for the calculation is objective in pre-Bernoullian times, subjective following Bernoulli, and again objective after von Neumann and Morgenstern. 14 A difficulty with the mathematics of the axiomatic constraints as set out by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and others is that one either needs to discuss it extensively, or forego any formal notation. For reasons of space and because it is not directly the subject of the paper, I choose the latter. Furthermore, I have to leave for another occasion a discussion on the influential role of logicians such as Frank Ramsey in the development of the axiomatic constraints. For useful overviews of the mathematics see for instance Mas -Colel (1995) and Fishburn (1981) . 15 Savage (1948,1952) normative. It is the distinction between the science of economics and the art of economics as argued for by for instance J.S. Mill (1844) , or the distincttion between theorizing with the norms fixed and theorizing about the norms, as argued for by for instance Robbins (1932) .
Savage on the other hand adheres to the a priori approach of mathematics 16 , which goes back to Kant's distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge 17 . An a priori theory is true because it is true by (logical) definition, without any directly associated empirical content.
The positive-normative and the a priori approach towards a mathe matical theory on human behavior are, however, by no means incompatible. As long as the theory is not disproved by empirical or theoretical counter argument, it can perfectly well function as a positive theory in economics and as an a priori theory in (applied) mathematics. This is precisely what happened in Savage (1948, 1952) .
Accepting von Neumann and Morgenstern's utility concept and axiomatic approach,
Friedman and Savage put themselves in the tradition of "Bernoulli's celebrated analysis of the St. Petersburg paradox" 18 , but broaden this research by including all (economic) choice situations that involve uncertainty of some sort. The basic problem they want to address is the fact that although an accomplished result, Bernoulli's concave utility functions can only explain insurance, not gambling. That is, Bernoulli's utility function offers an explanation for the fact that people are willing to pay money to reduce risk, but therewith also supposes that people will not engage in fair, or less than fair gambles. This is a problem that goes beyond insurances and gambles. In order to explain the co-existence of both risk-averse and riskseeking behavior the utility function would have to be concave and convex at the same time.
One could solve this problem by observing that the amounts of money for which people insure themselves are typically lower than the often very high amounts of money people can win in gambles and lotteries. In that case, Bernoulli's concave utility function is followed by a convex part. But then one forgets, as Friedman and Savage quickly observe, that in lotteries there often is a range of prices, including relatively low prices. The only way to rationalize this behavior is a "wiggly utility curve" that describes people as risk-averse for low incomes, risk-seeking for higher incomes, and again risk-averse for the highest incomes.
16 Jallais and Pradier (2005) 17 Hanna (2004) 18 Friedman and Savage (1948) , p.281 Figure 2 , Friedman and Savage (1948), p.297 An obvious objection that can be raised upon the construction of such a utility curve is that it is "patently unrealistic to suppose that individuals consult a wiggly utility curve before gambling or buying insurance. ….
Stated differently, the test by results is the only possible method of determining whether the as if statement is or is not a sufficiently good approximation to reality for the purpose at hand.
…
Whatever the psychological mechanism whereby the individuals make choices, these choices appear to display some consistency, which can apparently be described by our utility hypothesis. This hypothesis enables predictions to be made about phenomena on which there is not reliable evidence. The hypothesis cannot be declared invalid for 19 Friedman and Savage (1948) 
Kahneman and Tversky
After the 1952 Paris conference with Allais economics and psychology went separate ways.
Economics maintained EUT within the positive-normative distinction as a positive as-if theory of rational human behavior, psychology started to use EUT as a normative theory from which behavior by people in the real world who do not (yet) know the theory may differ. This marks the beginning of some thirty years during which psychologists and economists using EUT talk little, if at all to one another.
Although the psychologists following Savage recognize that decision theory is a normative theory, they do in first instance not denounce it completely as a descriptive theory, quite the contrary. Ward Edwards, one of the main decision theorists in psychology during the 1950s and 1960s, concludes that people behave largely in line with the normative theory. The only situation in which they can really be said to deviate from the normative theory is in their handling of new information of uncertain events. In those situation people are systematically more conservative than they should. For the rest, however, subjects' behavior in experiments is pretty much in accordance with the normative theory 24 . Another characteristic of the first twenty years after Savage is that the experiments conducted by the psychologists are confined to so-called 'small world' situations, a term from Savage (1954) , in which the task and the description of the task are always clearly logical and probabilistic. Experiments typically involve urns with poker chips of different colors on the basis of which subjects have to compute some probability distribution.
Both these characteristics change with the research of Kahneman and Tversky. In the 1960s, Kahneman is predominantly working on the psychophysics of vision and, related, on semantic differential (SD) research 25 . In both of these research domains the question is how humans perceive objectively given stimuli and, especially in the case of vision, what perceptual errors may occur. For instance, in a series of follow-up articles Kahneman shows that the subjective perception of a visual stimulus depends on how busy an individual is 24 Edwards (1954 Edwards ( ,1961 25 e.g. Kahneman (1963; 1966a,b) , Kahneman and Norman (1967) , and performing other tasks 26 . If you give people some simple math problems to solve they are less likely to perceive a weak visual stimulus as compared to when they are not engaged in such a task. This could for example be a confirmation of the intuitive observation that car drivers Kahneman et.al. (1967) , Kahneman and Peavler (1969) 27 e.g. Tversky (1969) , Tversky and Russo (1969) 28 e.g. Tversky (1967a,b) , Pollatsek and Tversky (1970) , Tversky and Krantz (1970) , and 29 . Volumes II and II appear in 1989 and 1990 . 30 Tversky and Kahneman (1971 ,1974 ,1977 and Kahneman and Tversky (1972 ,1979 31 Tversky and Kahneman (1971) and Kahneman start to make a clearer distinction between the normative solution to a problem and the subjective answer given by real-world individuals. Increasingly, the normative- With their publication in Econometrica in 1979 Kahneman and Tversky export their findings to economics. Rhetorically, it is a clever article. It tells the economists that EUT as a positive theory systematically deviates from real-world decision behavior of human beings.
For economists who do not care about the descriptive realism of a theory but are only interested in its predictive merits the systematic deviations are a decisive argument. The article also marks the beginning of a more conscious attempt of Tversky and Kahneman to come to a complete rationalization of real-world decision behavior of human beings. This descriptive theory, labeled prospect theory, with increasing explicitness turns the clock back to before von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) . Utility in prospect theory is not an absolute given but depends on the individual's subjective perception 32 . Prospect theory therewith brings us back to Bernoulli. In case of the subjective perception of utility (labeled 'value') the relation looks as follows.
32 Also for probability a distinction is made between the objective and the subjective value. close adherence to the work of Tversky and Kahneman, however, the research produced by roundtable members can methodologically be divided into a group that follows the psychologists' normative-descriptive distinction, and a group that follows economics' positive-normative distinction.
Main figures in the first group are Tversky and Kahneman themselves, and economists like Thaler, Sunstein, and Sugden. In this research the psychophysical distinction between the normative (objective), and the descriptive (subjective) theory becomes more and more pronounced. As it has been shown time and again that individuals' subjective perception of utility and probabilities are different from their objective values, the main focus of the psychological line is to conceptually define and measure subjective utilities and probabilities 34 . To distinguish between the utility of the normative and the descriptive theory,
Kahneman from the beginning of the 1990s onwards argues for a conceptual distinction 33 See Sent (2005) for an overview of research that employs the term Behavioral Economics. 34 This prgram is set out in for instance Tversky and Kahneman (1986) , Quattrone and Tversky (1988) , Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , and Kahneman (2003) To cut the story short, in an extension to the normative-descriptive distinction, Kahneman and his collaborators in RSF behavioral economics argue for a 'prescriptive' theory of decision-making 38 . They promote a re-interpretation of economics in terms of a 35 e.g. Kahneman (1994 Kahneman ( , 2003 , Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997) 36 e.g. Simonson and Tversky (1992) , Tversky and Wakker (1995) , Fox and Tversky (1995) , Wakker, Thaler, and Tversky (1997) 37 e.g. Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) 38 e.g. Thaler (1991), Thaler and Sunstein (2003) , Kahneman and Sugden (2005) A good example of this approach is the research on hyperbolic discounting. In the traditional economic theory people are described as if they discount future income exponentially. However, it turns out that real-world behavior systematically deviates from this theory. The dis count factor for a financial gain in thirty-one instead of thirty days from now is lower than the discount factor for a financial gain tomorrow instead of today. Real-world individuals are hence better described as-if they discount hyperbolically. 
Conclusion
Kahneman and Tversky and their behavioral economics stand in a long tradition of explaining human behavior in mathematical terms. The problems that the initial attempt to describe rational human behavior in mathematical term ran into were partly resolved by Bernoulli Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) 42 e.g. Camerer (1997 ), Loewenstein (1999 43 Rabin (1998), Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) economic community with him, continued to use EUT as a basis for positive theories that predict well.
The work of Kahneman and Tversky, then, is to be seen in the psychological research that built upon Savage's work. However, using psychophysics Tversky and Kahneman made the difference between normative and descriptive theory more pronounced. Their 1979
Econometrica article marks the beginning of a project to come to a full descriptive theory of rational human behavior along the existing normative theory. One branch of the RSF behavioral economics founded upon their work continues this research and has in recent years extended the normative-descriptive distinction with a third 'prescriptive' part that tells how people can be made to behave more in accordance with the normative theory. A second branch of RSF behavioral economics, however great their gratitude to Kahneman and Tversky, continues to work in the Friedman tradition of economics. It argues that (behavioral) economics should gratefully integrate psychology's suggestions, but then return to the building of positive, mathematical theories that yield good predictions.
The anonymous author of The Economist, cited at the beginning of the article, is thus partly right. Behavioral economics is about rational behavior. However, looking at the RSF behavioral economics founded upon the work of Kahneman and Tversky, one branch leaves "the canonical model of rational choice" intact but searches for a descriptive counterpart. A second branch modifies "the canonical model", and thus does not leave it intact.
